

“SEMBRAR EL PETRÓLEO” REVISITADO: EL RETORNO DEL ESTADO DESARROLLISTA AL ECUADOR

Very preliminary version

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Abstract

Desde la inserción del Ecuador en el circuito petrolero internacional en 1972, el Estado desarrollista ha asumido la responsabilidad por la planificación de la economía en base a la renta petrolera, por “sembrar el petróleo”. Una interpretación inicial de este imperativo se desarrolló en el marco del primer *boom* petrolero que irrumpió a inicios de la década de 1970, cuando gobiernos militares se encontraban a la cabeza del Estado. Los regímenes democráticos retornaron al Ecuador en 1979 y tuvieron que enfrentar la crisis de la deuda que se esparcía por la región latinoamericana durante la década de 1980. La planificación de la economía durante las dos últimas décadas del siglo pasado estuvo marcada por una relativa ausencia del Estado en favor de la intervención de las fuerzas del mercado frente a la baja de los precios del petróleo.

El Estado desarrollista retorna al Ecuador a la par que en la región ascienden al poder democráticamente gobiernos de la ‘*pink tide*’. En el marco del *boom* petrolero de inicios del siglo veintiuno, el Estado ecuatoriano refuncionaliza el imperativo de sembrar el petróleo a partir de que el gobierno, en la administración desde 2007, ha planteado aprovechar ventajas competitivas del país antes que ventajas comparativas. La ponencia realiza un recorrido por los proyectos de desarrollo históricamente asentados sobre los recursos naturales y discute sobre las interacciones entre los poderes económico y político en el marco del discurso desarrollista en el Ecuador.

Introduction

Ecuador’s rush in the international oil circuit began in 1972 as a marginal exporter. Since then to sow the oil during boom periods has been an imperative of the developing state. Despite seemingly diverse development strategies driven throughout the last forty-five years,

to sow the oil has been widely interpreted as the necessity of state's engagement in economic diversification in order to draw away extractivism. The classic developmentalist state model provides theoretical rationalization to conceptualize import-substitution industrialization (ISI) as the structuralist strategy proposed at the beginning of the Ecuadorian oil era, which concurred with an international oil boom. The political project was supported by two successive military governments that declared to pursue more egalitarian development perspectives as well as reduction of poverty.

After return to democratic regimes in 1979, last decades of the twentieth century were coined by a relative absence of state's planning of the economy in favor of market mediation to face the end of the first oil boom. Scenarios opened by neoliberal globalization since the debt crisis of the 1980s paved the way for the return of the developmentalist state to Ecuador concurring with the 'left turn'. At regional level, 'pink tide' governments democratically seized power along Latin America, overlapping with a commodities' boom that initiated with the 21st century. The imperative of sow the oil re-organized around the neo-structuralist strategy promoted by the Ecuadorian so-called 'progressist' government in office since 2007. Despite of the '*buen vivir*' or 'good living' alternative-to-development discourse of its first years, current decade-lasting government's development view fits into mainstream sustainable or human development goals: a catch-up process with developed economies supported on natural resources.

The state appears in both periods as a non-neutral actor that shapes developmentalist policies while achieving positive outcomes in economic and social indicators by redistribution of oil rent among society's groupings and economic sectors.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to a broader academic debate about the role of the state in natural resources' rent-dependent countries. Therefore, it examines comparatively two periods of recent Ecuadorian economic history where to sow the oil was a main goal of the state, and argues that the economic as well as the sociopolitical spheres can be rationalized with analytical categories related to the developmentalist state model.

To "sow the oil": The state and development

Latin American contributions to development theories comprise a varied range of theoretical as well as methodological perspectives. Key inputs to development thinking have to do with

the inclusion of the state as ubiquitous actor of the process of development and the role of nature within a generously gifted region. Since its enunciation in Venezuela in 1936, the expression “sow the oil” (Uslar Pietri 1936) has been widely employed to address the use of extractive rent in natural resources-dependent countries and started to function as a discourse where “concepts, theories, and practices are systematic created” (Escobar 1995a, 39), hence, nature-state-development relationships are acknowledged. Beyond using natural resources rent to attain economic diversification that transcends extractivism, the main role of the developmentalist state has been to establish a more autonomous development pattern by switching from an outward-oriented development model based on exports of natural goods that follows the historical role of Latin America as world’s provider of raw material. The study of such an endeavor of the state requires a more holistic approach that includes not only the sphere of the economy but also the sociopolitical sphere. Latin American structuralism offers the theoretical background to rationalize the classic developmentalist state from an economic perspective while populism serves as framework to approach the relationship between state and society. Diverse but concrete consequences of the application of the Washington Consensus (WC) agenda across the region speak for the reassessment of the classic developmentalist state model. In this logic, neo-structuralism, on the one sphere of the economy, and neo-extractivism, on the sociopolitical sphere, are used to portray the neo-developmental state.

Similarly to other theories, the rise of structuralism contained elements of rejection to the previous dominant paradigm of development thinking. Evolutionism implied in modernization theories was deeply criticized by structuralism, initially from an economic perspective based on the theoretical contributions made by ECLA (now ECLAC or the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). The proposed switch of the unit of analysis from individual states to a world structure composed by central and peripheral countries implied the need to reassess the weight of external conditions in the design of Latin American countries’ development strategy. From the 1950s until the 1970s, the *cepalina* or structuralist school of development theories placed a paradigm that linked development with industrialization and elaborated a concrete proposal that included external conditions: import-substitution industrialization (ISI). The ISI strategy, conceived as a

capitalist development strategy to catch-up with developed economies, required a leading role of the state in carrying out economic diversification policy and protecting domestic industry in favor of an inward-oriented development model. The industrialization proposal comprised a first stage where local manufactured goods were intended to fulfill local demand, sometimes referred to as ‘easy ISI’, and an ultimate stage where industrialization’s output was anticipated for export. The size of the economy was regarded by classical structuralist authors as a critical fact: due to the size of the individual national markets in Latin America, the inward-oriented development model supported regional integration.

Kay (1989, 134) asserts that ECLAC’s writings, the theoretical compendium of structuralism, omitted an “explicit social and political theory”. In order to fulfil this gap, besides an economic sphere, a sociopolitical sphere is assigned to structuralism where state-society relationship is outlined. The accomplishment of the structuralist strategy (i.e. the establishment of an inward-oriented development model) required, at national level, the promotion of investments in ISI, undertaken mainly by the capitalist private sector, while fostering internal private consumption. Therefore the need, at international level, to review the links with the center countries. Natural resources rent became central to these objectives, thus the state was envisioned to (1) appropriate rent with acquiescence of internal capitalist sectors, and (2) exert control over rent, thus become an agent that distributes rent among different sectors of society. Rent control was supported on property of subsoil resources and public-owned companies to undertake extractivist activity, whilst rent allocation was aimed to control the sociopolitical sphere. When rent’s destination was linked to “a major increase in government expenditure for development purposes”, Kay (1989, 28) identifies a central characteristic of an “ideological current known as *desarrollismo*”. Since the masterpiece of the envisioned inward-oriented development model entailed economic diversification, import-substitution industrialization (ISI) epitomized the harvest from sowing the oil.

Chiasson-LeBel (2016, 891) states that “the pursuit of an ISI development model interacts well with corporatism”, understood as a form of state-society relationship characterized by “monopoly representation by sector-specific organizations, tolerated by business interest groups and protected by the state”. Hence, corporatism is regarded as central in the

“pluralistic coalition to achieve reform” advocated by populism (Malloy 1977, 12). Even though O’Donnell (1977) uses the term corporatism specially to address a set of structures which link society with a specific type of state, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, the concept appears to fit for populist periods, in general (O’Donnell 1977, 48). Rather than focusing in other nuances, or discussing the prevalence of corporatist arrangements with society’s groupings through “inducements or constraints” as in Collier and Collier (1979), this paper argues a corporatist state is a populist state that “is intimately related to patterns of growth of a type of late, dependent, uneven, but also extensively industrialized capitalism” (O’Donnell 1977, 48). Hence, the populist state emerges as a response to the previous natural resources export-led development model that dominated the Latin American. One of the main objectives of populism was to seize the state in order to take control over local economic activity by implanting an inward-oriented development model. The developmentalist state headed a populist alliance that challenged the power of local oligarchy (Malloy 1977, 13), that was at the top of the outward-oriented scheme and acted as link with center countries. The coalition, that varied alongside the region was mainly composed by “industrialists, middle classes, urban working classes” (Kay 1989, 19).

As populism identified an alliance between national oligarchy and foreign bourgeoisie in sights of perpetuating the previous outward-oriented model, the developmentalist alliance had a nationalist discourse. Kay (1989, 14) reminds that in contrast to the vision of the center countries, that often associated nationalism with imperialism and right wing political ideologies and movements, in the context of the periphery “nationalism acquires a progressive connotation, being the expression of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, or even anti-capitalist struggles”. Hence, the nationalist discourse entails a component of rejection to influence of external actors in national economy and politics. In order to “expand the support base for more effective and directive governmental decision-making” populist regimes mobilized popular support “not on the basis of class, but on the basis of citizenship” (Malloy 1977, 13). When linked to populism Kay (1989, 28) argues, *desarrollismo* became an “elusive political force” with an “anti-feudal and anti-oligarchical” ideology, and two additional features: “reformist and technocratic”. The reformist vein was underlined since the switch to the inward-oriented model was supposed to take place within capitalism; whilst, the

technocratic imprint was affirmed by an “administrative machine that can do the work of planning” (Lewis 1954, 122). An additional component of *desarrollismo* is related to trust in “popular enthusiasm [as] both the lubricating oil of planning, and the petrol of economic development – a dynamic force that almost makes all things possible” (Lewis 1954, 128). Under these conditions, the imperative of sow the oil has undertaken by the developmentalist state.

Development and the Ecuadorian oil era

Though extractivist activity in the Pacific coast can be traced back in the early twentieth century, the integration of the Amazon region (*‘el Oriente’*) to the global economy by multinational corporations paved the way for the beginning of the Ecuadorian oil era. Foreign companies not only discovered the Ecuadorian Amazon region for the world-system, they also shaped its representation for the rest of the country until present days. The Shell Oil Company arrived in 1937 and ‘founded’ the town of *Shell-Mera* in the Pastaza province. Former president Galo Plaza Lasso pronounced his well-known speech “the *Oriente* is a myth” alluding Shell’s negative to start business in Ecuador after the corporation abandoned the country in the late 1940s. *Lago Agrio*, the capital of the Sucumbíos province, was named after Texaco Petroleum Company’s first oil field in Texas: Sour Lake. Texaco (now Chevron) gained concessions for oil exploitation in the Amazon region in 1964 that were finally agreed for a 28-year period (Sawyer 2008, 322). In 1990, the multinational reverted all activities to the state-owned company before leaving. Though, nearly thirty years after, judicialization of the socio-environmental consequences of Texaco’s extractivist activities continue to challenge international law as well as the perception of the role of nature in the development of nations.

With the inauguration of the Lago Agrio – Esmeraldas pipeline, built by the Texaco Gulf consortium, and the arrival of the first oil barrel from the Amazonia to the Pacific after crossing 500 kilometers through the Andes, in 1972, Ecuador started its rush in the international oil circuit as a marginal-size exporter. Since then oil rent has not only molded the economic and sociopolitical spheres but also has been of paramount importance in shaping an imaginary of modernization. With his presidential address, during the

inauguration of the Trans-Ecuadorian pipeline and the Balao terminal in Esmeraldas, General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, the head of the 1972-1976 so-called ‘nationalist revolutionary’ military government, outlined a vision *à la* Ecuadorian of classic natural resources-based development:

“[Oil] will help us, certainly, in a preponderant way to resolve the problems that afflict the fatherland and particularly the Ecuadorian people. And of the Ecuadorian people, the marginalized, the dispossessed portion that still, by humanity’s sarcasm, struggles within misery, ignorance, dump, in lack of health services”. (General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, presidential speech, 26 July 1972)

Such a vision of development comprises oil rent in the core of economic growth and material welfare as it places extractivism above nature’s conservation. The Amazon region, after being assimilated to the world-economy, reaffirmed its condition of “sacrifice zone” (Svampa 2013) in benefit of the national developmentalist project. General Rodríguez Lara’s speech in the debut of the Ecuadorian oil era ended with the fill and delivery of 24 symbolic barrels to each of the regions (*prefecturas*) of Ecuador. The ‘first barrel of oil’ marched the day after, through the main city, Quito, at the top of a military parade.

Ecuadorian *dependentista* author Fernando Velasco (1981, 229), in his book completed in 1972 and published three years after his passing, *Ecuador: subdesarrollo y dependencia* (underdevelopment and dependence) did not dismiss the capacity of oil rent to “amend some imbalances in national economy” as he forewarned its potential to sharpen “distortions generated by the historical development process” and to deepen “contradictions of dependent capitalism”, anticipating contemporary academic debates about abundance of natural resources as “blessing or curse” (Gelb 1988). Together with intensive use of capital, limited demand of labor, and insufficient linkages with the rest of the economy, enclave conditions would tend to accentuate in presence of multinational corporations, of “giant corporations” (Velasco 1981, 213). In order to extend the possibilities of oil rent appropriation in benefit of the state, the ‘nationalist revolutionary’ military government had created the state company,

the *Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana* (CEPE), one month before the premiere of the Trans-Ecuadorian pipeline. Since 1974 CEPE operated in a joint venture with Texaco.

Ecuador's admission as a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at the end of 1973 sealed its insertion to the international oil circuit, and the beginning of the oil era as well. The first global oil shock (1973-1974), provoked by the oil embargo that major OPEC members proclaimed against the biggest oil consuming countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, evidenced the prevalence of (geo)political issues over the economical within the nature of international oil prices. Oil windfalls continued flourishing with the second global oil shock (1979-1980) triggered by the Iranian revolution and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. As other oil-exporting countries, Ecuador benefited of multiplied rent income until the beginning of the 1980s. A decade later, in 1992, in response to decreasing oil prices, the country abandoned OPEC in an attempt to compensate deteriorated income with increased offer. Ecuador resumed in 2007 within the framework of a new global commodities' boom and a freshly elected so-called "progressist" government.

A more conservative military triumvirate named *Consejo Supremo de Gobierno* (1976-1979), succeeded the so-called 'nationalist revolutionary' government (1972-1976) before return of democratic regimes in 1979. Thus, characterizing the "analytical narrative" (Di John 2009) of the period 1972-1982, or the economic and sociopolitical space where the imperative of sow the oil is undertaken, seems challenging due to the different governments types and democratic regimes.

Velasco (1981, 206) asserts that an easy ISI-attempt took place in Ecuador during the government of the *Junta Militar* (1963-1966). The author's explanation of the insufficient accomplishments of the industrialization effort relies on a classical *estructuralista* discussion that can be summarized in a statement of Raúl Prebisch (1984, 184): "peripheral industrialization had been greatly delayed and took place during successive crises at the centers". In fact, Velasco (1981, 206) argues that the ISI attempt took place "during a historical moment when ties with the metropolises were more tight and dependence

relationship was reinforced”. Carlos Larrea (1987, 26), in his analysis of the Ecuadorian banana era, *El banano en el Ecuador: transnacionales, modernización y subdesarrollo*, identifies (1) a period of boom and reinforcement of the natural resources-based development model (*auge y consolidación del modelo tradicional*) between 1948 and 1965, and (2) a crisis phase with a rearrangement of internal actors (*crisis y readecuación interna*) within the period 1965-1976. Thus, Velasco’s (1981) thesis entails further discussion besides the *estructuralista* argument: was the ISI attempt during the *Junta Militar* (1963-1966) inspired by the upcoming crisis of the natural resources-based development model (i.e. the decline of banana exports)?

The answer to this question exceeds the aim of the paper, it is rather argued that the background of the next ISI attempt, referred to as late ISI (*ISI tardío*), was not the crisis of the dominant outward-oriented development model that favored exports of natural resources. After switching to the oil era, the industrialization attempt endeavored within the ISI-corporatist period 1972-1982 took place within a world context shaped by high oil prices, the first Ecuadorian oil boom.

As opposing to the previous outward-oriented development model where local oligarchy, based specially in the Ecuadorian coastal region, benefited of the natural resources’ export-led scheme, *desarrollismo* or developmentalism *à la* Ecuadorian was fundamentally anti-oligarchical.

In contrast to previous export boom periods (the banana era, for example), where “the state was only a passive beneficiary”, Catherine Conaghan (1988, 48) argues that during the first Ecuadorian oil boom “the state directly captured a large portion of the surplus generated by oil export through its legal monopoly over exploitation rights and the creation of a state-owned oil company”. Furthermore, the author states that the capture of oil rent allowed the state to occupy “[...] an unprecedented dominant position in the economy” where its role of non-neutral rent distributor germinated: “with the state cast in the role of arbiter of the new oil wealth, the locus of decisions on the distribution of the surplus [or rent] shifted from the market into the heart of the state bureaucracy”.

Apparent failure of the developmentalist alliance according to Conaghan, that is why her book's name is "restructuring domination", not changing or switching. But, ample consensus around progress: the developmentalist state backed a coalition of relevant sectors of society that agreed upon the progressist vision of development. The classic developmentalist state emerges to cope with a previous outward model based on exports of natural resources, though the 'new' model is still nature-based. Even though nature was not a problem. With the nationalist component, *desarrollismo* re-assessed nature as 'strategic resources' under control and administration of the state. Thus, instead of other (private) actors, the state is responsible for natural resources to reach the world-economy, as it is in charge of internal rent distribution among national economic sectors and society's groupings.

Last decades of the twentieth century were coined by neoliberalism as a system of representation of reality that not only shaped the sphere of economics but also the sociopolitical sphere. As an overall framework for the Washington Consensus (WC) agenda, neoliberalism anticipated structural adjustment programs (SAP) that in different degrees imprinted the economies of the Latin American region, and implied a set of governance devices where the insight of the state's role in transforming the economy was meant to change radically. Between 1983 and 2006, a period referred to as "neoliberal-fragmented" (Chiasson-LeBel 2016), the Ecuadorian state experienced contraction of size and action in favor of an outward-oriented growth model that aimed to profit of natural endowments' exports, and to create conditions to attract foreign investment. The notion of 'sow the oil' was re-assessed following the imperative of comparative advantages: still the motor of economic development, nature was envisioned to grant access to globalization rather than to open gateways to diversification involving support to distinct economic sectors. Thus, economic diversification was in that period alike diversification of natural resources' exports besides oil. In 1989, the public company *Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador* (Petroecuador) was created in order to take charge of the activities of CEPE and also of Texaco, that was leaving the country. One of the competences Petroecuador inherited from Texaco was the operation of the Trans-Ecuadorian pipeline. Concurrently with the creation of the public company, conditions for its failed privatization were generated in line with the regional trend supported by WC's adjustment programs.

After withdrawal from OPEC in 1992, Ecuador undertook the increase of exploitation of its oil fields based on the expansion of foreign private sharing. As a consequence, at the beginning of the 21st century, parallel to the commodities' boom that initiated with an upward trend in international oil prices, crude exports of private multinational oil corporations overtook those of the national company by 2003 (Larrea 2006, 67). The end of that same year witnessed the start of operations of the heavy oil pipeline *Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados* (OCP) after two years of construction bankrolled with investments of foreign private corporations that started extractivist activities in the Ecuadorian Amazon region during the second half of the 1980s (Ortiz 2011, 12). Reform of the Ecuadorian legal framework that aimed to limit state's active role in economy, adhering to recommendations of structural adjustment programs, allowed private operation of the once considered most representative *oeuvre* within the strategic sectors. OCP will be transferred to the Ecuadorian state after 20 years of private operation, in 2023. The pipeline of about 500 km has served to transport crude exploited by its shareholders from Lago Agrio to the Pacific coast in the Esmeraldas province.

The end of the twentieth century also witnessed ultimate inclusion of the nature–society relationship and “semiotic struggles” (Escobar 1995b) to place its different understandings within the developmentalist discourse in Ecuador. At local level, the ecologist movement increased its participation in politics since the end of the 1980s (Lewis 2016, 55) originally introducing conservationist theses to public debate. At international level, the emergent discourse of sustainable development (United Nations 1987) recommended the inclusion of an environmental component in the discussion of economic development. One of the institutional ways in which the Ecuadorian state acknowledged the imperative of incorporating these dimensions to its approach of the nature–society relationship was the establishment of the Ministry of Environment in 1996. The outcome of institutionalization of ecologist discourses and practices was rather in line with administration or management of natural resources (Alarcón and Mantilla 2017, 93) compatible with the progressist vision. Although, the paradigm of development could be re-assessed. Several critics to the development model based on extractivism and to the concept of development itself emerged

from the study of socio-ecological consequences of oil exploitation in the Ecuadorian Amazon region.

The period 2007 – 2017 is referred to as selective industrialization and commerce (SIC)-neo-extractivist, since a neo-extractivist sociopolitical pattern seems to complete the analytical narrative. Accompanied with criticism, the term ‘Latin American neo-extractivism’ emerged since the beginning of the 21st century to conceptualize and discuss an apparently successful development strategy based on natural resources’ revenues that was positively mirrored in macroeconomic as well as in social indicators of several countries within the region. Whilst, the political legitimation of the scheme appears closely related to its central economic characteristic that involves relying on the primary sector within an international commodities’ boom in order to bankroll neo-developmental policies. As in many Latin American countries, in Ecuador, the return of the state to a more active role in planning induced reassessment of concepts to approach economic diversification within natural resource abundance. Rafael Correa’s so-called *progressist* government, at the top of the Ecuadorian state during the last ten years, ratified via official development plans the necessity of “sowing the oil”. In line with analogous pink tide administrations that benefited of the “*Consenso de los commodities*” (Svampa 2013), the Ecuadorian government reclaimed recovery of state’s ownership of natural resources, which is interpreted as a neo-extractivist imperative. Hence, the SIC strategy can be reinterpreted according to the growth model: extractivism as a comparative advantage (outward-oriented) should provide financial basis to exploit competitive advantages through backing selected industrial sectors (inward-oriented).

Tacitly accepting market prevalence, neo-structuralism provides scientific rationalization for selective industrialization and commerce (SIC) as the chosen economic diversification strategy (Andrade 2015) during the 2007-2017 period. Looking back to original structuralists ideas, but not fully relying on them, neo-structuralism advocates to selectively integrate to the economic world-system through competitive rather than comparative advantages (Kay and Gwynne 2000, 58) in order to create market niches. Hence, the SIC model implies a combined inward- and outward-oriented growth model. Neo-structuralism supports a reconfiguration of the relationship between the economical and the political spheres, thus

inducing to reformulate the role of the state in transforming the economy: creation of conditions (e.g. formulating policy) is envisioned rather than state's direct involvement in economic diversification (e.g. applying protectionist strategies, owing enterprises).

Often devastating social consequences of neoliberal strategies are one of the main lines in current academic debate about the return of the developmentalist state or its "renaissance" (Peters 2016). The country witnessed also high political instability with episodes of civil unrest that headed to shift governments before concluding regular administration periods. Other lines of the debate are linked to the positive performance regarding economic and social indicators attained by economies that did not strictly follow WC's postulates regarding thinness of the state or its withdrawal from central economic issues.

Similarly to the classic developmentalist state, the neo-developmental state emerges to cope with a previous outward model based on exports of natural resources, though the 'new' model is still nature-based. Specifically, the neo-developmental state emerges to cope with oil dependence (nature is now a problem), hence two aspects to re-assess *desarrollismo*: (1) reaching peak oil and (2) environmental awareness. Besides nationalist discourse (similar to the other period) there is an environmental component in the development discourse.

Conclusions

The paper should conclude that there are common characteristics in both periods (1972-1982 and 2007-2017) regarding the economic as well as the sociopolitical spheres. After a relative absence during the neoliberal period, the state 'returns' to Ecuador and plays a leading role planning economic diversification.

During the second period, there is more 'awareness' of external constraints. Market rules are accepted as well as 'inevitability' of a globalized economy. Maybe more conscience about the place in the world system, so commerce (foreign trade) is enforced in the SIC scheme. This neo-developmental vision is rationalized in neo-structuralism.

Positive outcomes in economic as well as in social indicators legitimize the development strategy in both periods, as consensus arises around the imaginary of capitalist development.

The inclusion of an environmental dimension in the second period imprints the neo-developmental pattern and forces to re-approach natural resources within a liberal epistemic pattern epitomized by sustainable development.

Dependence on natural resources' rent remains as the material source for intended economic diversification.

Outcomes of economic diversification are examined in the next paper.

Planning appears aside science and technology and international organizations as apparently neutral tools that grant the developmental project an apolitical appearance (Escobar 1995a; Ferguson 1994).

structuralism shares with modernization theories the vision of nature as a prerequisite for capitalist development

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